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Abstract
Purpose – Many examinations of police misconduct involve case study methodologies
applied to a single agency, or a handful of agencies. Consequently, there is little
evidence regarding the types of misconduct across agencies, or the impact of
department-level characteristics on the nature and prevalence of officer deviance. The
purpose of this paper is to address this research gap using statewide data of over 1,500
charges of police misconduct filed with the Arizona Peace Officer Standards and
Training Board (AZPOST) from 2000 to 2011.
Design/methodology/approach – This study examines variation in the prevalence and
forms of misconduct across 100+ agencies based on agency type and size. Difference
scores were calculated for every agency in the state to determine whether an agency’s
level of misconduct was proportionate to the number of officers employed by that
agency. AZPOST data were supplemented with Law Enforcement Management and
Statistics data to identify organizational correlates of misconduct in agencies generating
disproportionately low and high levels of misconduct.
Findings – Results identify variation in officer misconduct across different types of
agencies. Tribal agencies generally experience higher rates of domestic violence and
drug/alcohol-related incidents. Smaller agencies have more misconduct allegations
involving supervisors. Organizational characteristics including pre-hiring screening,
accountability mechanisms and community relationships are associated with lower
levels of agency misconduct.
Originality/value – The use of AZPOST data enables a statewide examination of
misconduct while accounting for organizational context. This study identifies
organizational features that might serve to protect agencies against disproportionate
rates of officer misbehavior.

Keywords
Police organizations, Police accountability, Police misconduct, Police deviance, Police
oversight

Any criminal activity, within a police department or elsewhere, cannot thrive
unless all of its participants are able to maintain confidence in each other (Knapp
Commission, 1972, p. 11).
More than 20 LAPD officers witnessed King’s beating, which continued for nearly
two minutes. Those who administered it assumed that their fellow officers would
not report the misconduct and were prepared to lie on their behalf. In this
respect, police brutality is like police corruption- there may be some rotten
apples, but usually the barrel itself is rotten. Two cops can go berserk, but twenty
cops embody a subculture of policing (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993, p. 12).
A well-functioning accountability system is the keystone to lawful policing. In
combination with effective supervision, a robust accountability system is required
in order to identify and correct inappropriate uses of force and other kinds of
misconduct—with discipline, training, and counseling as appropriate—which in
turn helps prevent misconduct. But Chicago seldom holds officers accountable
for misconduct (Civil Rights Division, 2017a, p. 46 (Findings Letter- Chicago
Police Department)).
Despite significant advances in strategies and tools over the last 40 years,
policing continues to be defined by a persistent undercurrent of officer misconduct
(White and Fradella, 2016). For example, since 1994 the Civil Rights Division of the US
Department of Justice has conducted nearly 70 “pattern or practice” investigations of
police agencies, most recently in Ferguson, Baltimore and Chicago (see quote above)
(Civil Rights Division, 2017b). In 2014, then President Obama created the President’s
Task Force on 21st Century Policing to identify recommendations for enhancing trust
between police and citizens, and for improving police accountability. In May–June 2017
alone, prosecutions concluded for five officers accused of killing citizens, including
Michael Slager (Walter Scott), Betty Shelby (Terence Crutcher), Ray Tensing (Samuel
DuBose), Dominique Heaggan-Brown (Sylville Smith) and Jeronimo Yanez (Philando
Castile) (Park, 2017)[1]. Cases of police misconduct can have far-reaching, severe
consequences for both the community and police department—from psychological and
physical trauma experienced by victims to expensive civil judgments and compromised
police legitimacy (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993).
Researchers have devoted significant attention to the causes and correlates of
police deviance, and this work has advanced our understanding of the individual-level
predictors of misconduct (Harris, 2010; Kane and White, 2013; Waugh et al., 1988).
However, nearly all examinations of police misconduct involve case study
methodologies of one or a couple of agencies (Cohen and Chaiken, 1972; Harris, 2010;
Kane and White, 2009; Rojek et al., 2015). There are few examinations of police
misconduct across multiple agencies (Eitle et al., 2014), and virtually no studies at the
state level. Consequently, little is known about the prevalence and types of misconduct
across police agencies, and there is a dearth of empirical evidence on how departmentlevel characteristics might contribute to (or protect against) officer deviance. This

research gap is especially troubling because most prevailing theories of police deviance
prominently feature department-level correlates (Kappeler et al., 1998), and current
accountability mechanisms often target organizational deficiencies as the source of
misconduct (Civil Rights Division, 2017b; Walker and Archbold, 2014). The quotes at
the beginning of this paper emphasize these points and highlight the importance of a
focus on organizational features of police agencies to control misconduct.
This study addresses this research gap through an examination of more than
1,500 charges of police misconduct filed with the Arizona Peace Officer Standards and
Training Board (AZPOST), from 2000 to 2011. We examine variation in the prevalence
and forms of police misconduct across agencies, and use a case study approach to
assess organizational correlates of misconduct among agencies that experience
disproportionately low and high levels of officer deviance. The paper concludes with
implications of our findings for the continued study of police officer misconduct.

Literature review
Defining misconduct
There are numerous and sometimes overlapping definitions of police deviance
(the terms “deviance” and “misconduct” are used interchangeably in the paper) (Kane
and White, 2009). For example, some offenses committed by officers have nothing to
do with their police status. Kane and White’s (2009, p. 745) classification of misconduct
is useful for this study:
(1) Profit-motivated crimes: all offenses, other than drug trafficking, whether on
duty or off duty, in which the end or apparent goal of officers’ wrongdoing doing
was profit.
(2) Off-duty crimes against persons: all assaultive behavior, except for profitmotivated robberies, by off-duty officers.
(3) Off-duty public order crimes: all offenses, other than drug trafficking or
possession, against public order, including driving while intoxicated and
disorderly conduct.
(4) Drugs: possession and sale of drugs, and related conspiracies, as well as
failing or refusing to submit to departmental drug tests.
(5) On-duty abuse: all offenses by on-duty officers that involve the use of
excessive force, psychological abuse or discrimination based on citizens’
membership in a class (i.e. gender, race, ethnicity or sexual preference).
(6) Obstruction of justice: conspiracy, perjury, official misconduct and all offenses
in which the apparent goal is obstruction or subversion of judicial proceedings.

(7) Administrative/failure to perform: failure to abide by departmental regulations
concerning attendance, performance, obedience, reporting and conduct not
included in other offense types.
(8) Conduct-related probationary failures: all misconduct-related terminations of
probationary officers in which misconduct in types 1–7 is not specified, and
excluding simple failure in training programs.
Theories of misconduct
Much of the early work on police misconduct focused on individual-level
explanations, such as the “authoritarian personality” (Adorno et al., 1950; Neiderhoffer,
1967) and the “rotten apple” theory (Sherman, 1974). The Knapp Commission (1972)
criticized the rotten apple theory, arguing that it is insufficient and masks the
organizational deficits leading to misconduct.
Subcultural and organizational perspectives have also figured prominently in
theories of police misconduct (Bayley and Mendelsohn, 1969; Carbado, 2016; King,
2009; Sherman, 1978; Worden, 1995). Kappeler et al. (1998) proposed an
anthropological framework grounded in the occupational subculture of the police, along
with opportunity and organizational elements that facilitate deviance. Others have
explained police misconduct through the lens of the “noble cause,” arguing that the
goals of policing are so noble that the means to achieve those goals become secondary
(Crank and Caldero, 2000; Delattre, 1989; Klockars, 1980; Wolfe and Piquero, 2011).
Smith (1984) highlighted the significance of organizational measures: “Any theory of
legal control that ignores the organizational context in which police operate cannot
adequately account for police behavior across different organizational contexts” (p. 33).
Similarly, Punch (2009) argued that institutional, not individual, factors lie at the basis of
police misconduct.
More recently, researchers have also applied general criminological theories to
the study of police misconduct, often centrally featuring organizational or subcultural
elements (Donner, Fridell and Jennings, 2016; Donner, Maskaly and Fridell, 2016).
These theories have included social learning (Chappell and Piquero, 2004), deterrence
(Pogarsky and Piquero, 2003), life-course (Harris, 2010, 2016), low self-control (Donner
and Jennings, 2014), strain (Bishopp et al., 2016) and control-balance theory (Hickman
et al., 2001).
Correlates of police misconduct
Though researchers have explored community-level influences on police
misconduct (see Eitle et al., 2014; Kane, 2002; Klinger, 1997, for examples), we focus
our attention on individual and organizational features, given space constraints and our
research questions.
Individual factors. A handful of studies have attempted to link static
characteristics of officers to police misconduct (Lawton, 2007; Rabe-Hemp, 2008).

These include examinations of officer gender (see Hickman et al., 2000; Hoffman and
Hickey, 2005; Waugh et al., 1988), which find that female officers are subject to fewer
complaints and are less likely to use weapons and cause injury in use of force incidents.
Research also finds that high force rate officers are generally younger (Brandl and
Stroshine, 2013). Examinations of officer race and misconduct is mixed, suggesting an
important role for other confounding variables, including organizational features such as
assignment (see Kane and White, 2009; see also Cohen and Chaiken, 1972; Paoline et
al., 2017; Rojek and Decker, 2009). Research examining the relationship between
officer education and misconduct is also mixed (Eterno, 1996; Paoline and Terrill,
2007). Some reports that college-educated officers received fewer complaints (Kappeler
et al., 1992) and were less likely to experience career-ending misconduct (Kane and
White, 2009). Others have found no significant association between officer education
and use of force (Truxillo et al., 1998). Cohen and Chaiken (1972) reported that records
of dismissal in prior jobs and military discipline were associated with internal rule
violations. Poor academy performance has also been associated with poor performance
on the street (Grant and Grant, 1996; Harris, 2014). Kane and White (2009) reported
that prior criminal history and poor employment history were both associated with
increased risk of misconduct. Furthermore, predictors of misconduct may vary across
different stages of an officer’s career (White and Kane, 2013).
Organizational factors. Though organizational factors figure centrally into many
theories of police misconduct, empirical research on the role of organizational variables
in misconduct research is limited[2]. Herbert (1998) identified six subcultural factors—
called “normative orders”—that explained variation in police behavior at the
organizational level. These include: the law, bureaucratic control, adventure/machismo,
safety, competence and morality. Klinger (1997) highlighted the role of informal
community and departmental norms in determining how police respond to crime in
certain neighborhoods, and Kane (2002) suggested that this “ecology of patrol”
perspective may also explain rates of police misconduct. Shjarback and White (2016)
found an association between agency commitment to college education and lower
levels of violence in police-citizen encounters. Eitle et al. (2014, p. 120) conducted one
of the few studies to examine the interplay between organizational features of police
departments—size, internal affairs units and in-service training—and the prevalence of
misconduct, concluding “Many studies that examine police behavior focus exclusively
on microlevel variables and do not take organizational and other aggregate factors
explicitly into account. Our results suggest that these types of studies are incomplete
with respect to explaining the behavior of individual police officers.”
More broadly, the adoption of restrictive administrative policies governing use of
deadly force has resulted in significant decreases in police shootings—both justified and
unjustified—in numerous jurisdictions (Fyfe, 1979; Geller and Scott, 1992; White, 2001).
The impact of policy extends to lower levels of force as well (Terrill and Paoline, 2017).
However, the link between policy and officer behavior is contingent on enforcement of

the policy (White and Fradella, 2016). Quite simply, officers avoid behavior that will get
them into trouble.
Several large-scale investigations of police scandals have highlighted
organizational deficiencies as the source of widespread officer misconduct
(Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991; Knapp
Commission, 1972), and many police scholars argue that reform efforts must target
organizational features of police agencies rather than individual officers (Skolnick and
Fyfe, 1993; Walker and Archbold, 2014). The Civil Rights Division (2017b, p. 3) of the
US DOJ has entered into 40 reform agreements (e.g. consent decrees) with police
agencies via their authority under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, and the focus of those
agreements is to “address institutional failures that cause systemic police misconduct.”
Research on the impact of consent decrees is limited, but studies indicate that they can
produce positive organizational change in the short term (Alpert et al., 2017; Chanin,
2015; Davis et al., 2005) and may reduce problematic police behavior (Powell et al.,
2017).
The identification of organizational influences on misconduct has been hampered
by the difficulty of investigating the phenomena across agencies (Eitle et al., 2014).
Multi-agency studies of officer deviance enable a deeper exploration of the
organizational characteristics that serve as risk and protective factors for misconduct,
and can establish a foundation for more informed departmental strategies for preventing
officer misbehavior. One method for conducting multi-agency studies is to use data from
state Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) boards. POST data come from a
large and diverse range of jurisdictions collected through a common methodology,
allowing for a more robust analysis of policy and theory in the effort to control police
misconduct.
In their model minimum standards, the International Association of Directors of
Law Enforcement Standards and Training (IADLEST) (2017) explained that POST
boards were largely created in response to the 1967 President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement, though some states had established these boards as early as 1959. In
describing the establishment and purpose of POST boards, IADLEST (2017) writes:
“POST organizations were created out of the crucible of conflict, change, and the
demand for professionalism and ethics in public officers. POST programs exist to
assure all citizens that peace officers meet minimum standards of competency and
ethical behavior.” Thus, POST boards serve an important oversight function through
developing a common set of standards to delineate appropriate hiring and firing
practices for police agencies (Atherley and Hickman, 2013). Many POST boards are
specifically responsible for certifying law enforcement officers who have met
qualification standards, and revoking certification when officers violate established
certification guidelines (Atherley and Hickman, 2013). This study addresses the limited
examination of organizational correlates of police misconduct through a state-level
analysis of officer misconduct (at the departmental level) using AZPOST data.

Data and methods
We use data from AZPOST to examine the nature, prevalence and
organizational correlates of police misconduct in agencies throughout Arizona. These
data represent over 1,500 charges of misconduct reported to AZPOST from 2000 to
2011, committed by sworn officers from more than 100 police agencies, including large
municipal departments, suburban agencies, sheriff’s departments, tribal police, state
agencies, university departments and small-town constables. AZPOST is further
responsible for certifying over 10,000 peace officers. AZPOST was established through
state statute and is mandated by the legislature to certify individual officers, establish
training criteria and investigate reported incidences of officer misconduct. The AZPOST
board consists of 13 members including the Arizona attorney general, police and
correctional representatives, and members of the public[3]. Misconduct cases are
forwarded to AZPOST by the employer agency; thus, reporting misconduct to AZPOST
is largely voluntary. The voluntary nature of reporting is a notable limitation of this study,
and it may shape the types of cases in the data. For example, incidents reported to
AZPOST might represent the most serious forms of misconduct, since the agency has
made the decision to seek external review of the officer, which could result in decertification. Though reporting misconduct to AZPOST is voluntary, we only identified
one agency in the state that did not report a single incident of misconduct to AZPOST
during our study period[4]. Upon receiving a case of alleged misconduct, AZPOST staff
attorneys and investigators create a case brief for board review and adjudication.
AZPOST maintains the right to suspend and/or revoke an officer’s AZPOST
certification, which prohibits that officer from holding a police position in Arizona.
This study explores three research questions:
RQ1. What are the characteristics of officers and misconduct cases at the
state level?
This question is examined descriptively:
RQ2. Does misconduct vary by agency type or size?
We investigate variation in misconduct across 100+ agencies, with a specific
focus on agency type (municipal, county, tribal and state) and size (o100; 100499; 500+ officers):
RQ3. Are there distinguishable organizational features of agencies that
generate disproportionately low and high rates of misconduct?
To identify outliers, we calculate a difference score for each agency by
subtracting the agency’s percentage of total officers in the state from the percentage of
AZPOST cases originating in that agency. This calculation assumes the rates of
misconduct will be equivalent across various types of agencies. Since there are very
few multi-agency studies of misconduct, we adopt the null hypothesis (i.e. an
expectation of equivalence). We use Law Enforcement Management and Statistics

(LEMAS) data from 2007 to examine the organizational characteristics of agencies with
disproportionate difference scores (i.e. low and high-misconduct generators)[5]. The
LEMAS data contain information regarding organizational features such as hiring
processes, training, staffing and agency operations.

Results
Officer and case characteristics
Table I shows officer and case-level characteristics of AZPOST cases. Most
misconduct cases involved line-level (80.3 percent), male (88.9 percent) officers. There
is a wide range in misconduct charges, with most allegations involving administrative
violations or “failure to perform” (32.6 percent). Other common offenses include
untruthful behavior (false reports, 16.5 percent) and drug/alcohol offenses (9.0 percent).
Traditional, serious forms of misconduct such as: profit-motivated corruption (6.9
percent), sexual misconduct (6.8 percent) and excessive force (1.0 percent) were
relatively rare. Notably, most of the misconduct described in the AZPOST data fits
nicely into Kane and White’s (2009) classification scheme described earlier. We point to
the modal category, “failure to perform” with some interest. General perceptions of
police misconduct stress active forms of misbehavior; however, our data indicate that
acts of omission are more frequent in Arizona.
AZPOST has a range of options to address misconduct allegations. In
approximately one-third of cases, the board did not take any action (31.6 percent). This
can occur when an incident is deemed to have been sufficiently addressed internally by
the agency, due to evidentiary issues, or when the behavior is considered outside of
AZPOST jurisdiction. An officer’s certification was revoked in just over 20 percent of
cases (21.6 percent). Administratively closed cases involve misconduct that is
investigated by a police agency internally, resulting in termination of the officer by that
agency (13.8 percent). AZPOST suspended an officer’s certification in 12.8 percent of
the cases. About 13 percent of officers voluntarily relinquished their certification[6].
Agency characteristics
Table II shows officer and case characteristics across the primary agency types,
and there is little notable variation across most variables. Cases from tribal agencies
differed in several ways, including greater percentages of cases involving
supervisors/command level officers (10.1 percent) and applicants/reserves (14.5
percent). Tribal agencies also experienced a greater percentage of cases involving
drug/alcohol offenses (15.9 percent) and domestic violence (11.9 percent). AZPOST
was more likely to suspend and revoke officers’ certifications in cases involving officers
from state agencies (17.6 and 24.2 percent, respectively). Table III shows officer and
case characteristics by agency size, and again, there are only a few notable differences.
For example, cases from small agencies were less likely to involve line-level officers
(77.4 percent), and cases from medium-sized agencies were slightly more likely to

involve domestic violence (8.2 percent). Voluntary relinquishment of certification was
more common in large agencies (19.3 percent).

Table 1. AZPOST descriptive statistics

Low- and high-misconduct-generator agencies
Difference scores were calculated for every agency in the state to determine
whether an agency’s level of misconduct (i.e. number of AZPOST cases) was
proportionate to the percentage of sworn officers in the state employed by each agency
(calculated using data from the 2010 FBI UCR; see Table IV). A difference score of 0
percent indicates that the number of misconduct cases in an agency was proportionate

to the sworn number of officers employed by the agency. A difference score greater
than 0 percent suggests an agency is overrepresented, and a difference score below 0
percent suggests an agency is under-represented in the misconduct data. The vast
majority of agency difference scores are close to 0 percent (given space constraints,
Table IV only shows agencies with a difference score greater than 1 percent or less
than −1 percent). For example, the Sunnyville[7] Police Department (SPD) employs
27.1 percent of the sworn officers in the state but only accounted for 11.99 percent of
misconduct cases during the study period. The difference score of −15.11 percent
indicates that SPD is substantially under-represented in the AZPOST data. The Baker
and Townsville Police Departments are also under-represented (−3.87 and −2.98
percent), while the Carson Police Department is over-represented in the AZPOST data
(+4.85 percent). Figure 1 provides a visual depiction of agency difference scores by
agency type. It is worth noting that the three low-misconduct generating agencies are
among the largest agencies in the state. The authors address the potential correlation
between agency size and protective organizational features in the discussion.

Table II. Characteristics of misconduct by agency type

Table V shows selected organizational characteristics from LEMAS data for the
outlier agencies identified in Table IV (the featured characteristics were selected
because prior research highlights their importance for the study of officer misconduct).
LEMAS includes data for all agencies with 100 or more sworn officers, but employs a
random sampling technique for smaller agencies. As a result, the 2007 LEMAS includes
data for 31 agencies in Arizona, including the identified low-misconduct-generator
agencies (Sunnyville, Townsville, Baker) and the high-misconduct-generator agency
(Carson). The remaining 27 agencies were combined into an “other” category.

Table III. Characteristics of misconduct by agency size

This case study-style examination among outlier agencies demonstrates stark
differences between the three low-generator agencies and the high-generator agency.
These differences persist across a wide range of organizational characteristics (notable
differences are italicized in Table V). The low-generator agencies have:
• more robust hiring processes (e.g. 13-16 steps, compared to 12 for Carson);
• more extensive training (e.g. 720-880 academy hours, compared to 585 for
Carson);
• higher starting salaries (e.g. $45,510-$50,856, compared to $27,441 for
Carson);
• greater transparency (e.g. crime statistics and citizen feedback available
through the agency website); greater reliance on data and analysis (e.g. use of
computers and hot spots analysis);
• greater commitment to community and problem-oriented policing; and
• more robust accountability systems (e.g. early warning systems; written racial
profiling policies).
LEMAS also reports agency information on citizen complaints for the use of force
(overall and sustained), and the low-generator agencies show substantially lower
complaint rates (0.59-2.70 per 100 officers), compared to Carson (5.65) (but see
Hickman and Poore, 2016 for concerns relating to LEMAS complaint data). Importantly,
the three low-generator agencies also appear notably different from the other 27
Arizona agencies along most of the organizational measures. These findings suggest a
clear association between robust organizational characteristics and lower rates of officer
misconduct.

Table IV. Agency difference scores based on discrepancies between the number of officers and
the number of AZPOST cases

Figure 1. Scatter plot of agency difference scores by agency type

Discussion and conclusions
As the quotes at the beginning of this paper illustrate, researchers and
policymakers have emphasized the importance of organizational features that foster
and protect police misconduct for the last 50 years. Though individual level correlates of
police misconduct have been well established in the literature, little research has
addressed the influence of organizational features. This study addresses this research
gap through a state-level examination of the nature, prevalence and organizational
correlates of misconduct across 100+ police agencies.
We first examined the characteristics of misconduct cases at the state level, and
our findings are consistent with prior research (Kane and White, 2009). Most officers
accused of misconduct are male, line level and engage in a wide variety of behaviors. It
is also important to note that the major forms of misconduct often highlighted in prior
research, such as excessive force and profit-motivated corruption, are rare. Rather, acts
of omission were the most common form of misconduct. This is a notable finding given
our initial concern that the most serious forms of misconduct (i.e. deemed by the agency
to be worthy of state-level review) would be over-represented in AZPOST data.
Second, we explored whether the nature and prevalence of misconduct cases
varied by agency type and size. The primary takeaway involves the considerable
consistency across the board. However, there were a few exceptions, particularly
regarding small and tribal agencies. Supervisors in small and tribal agencies are more

Table V. LEMAS comparison of agencies generating high and low rates of misconduct

likely to be accused of misconduct, though this finding may be explained by the fact that
supervisors in those agencies are more likely to engage in routine patrol activities,
thereby increasing their opportunities to engage in misconduct. Notably, the three lowmisconduct generating agencies are among the largest agencies in the state,
suggesting a correlation between agency size (and perhaps, resources) and the
presence of protective organizational correlates. The reasons for this are unclear,
though it may be tied to staffing patterns in large agencies that minimize opportunities
for misconduct (e.g. officers assigned to investigative and administrative positions have
fewer citizen contacts). Further, the candidate pools for positions in such departments

are generally large, allowing for a wider range of better choices. Alternatively, large
agencies tend to have more specialized units, and Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) argued that
it may be more difficult to detect misconduct in departments with high degrees of
specialization. That said, the correlation between agency size and misconduct is by no
means perfect. The vast majority of agencies in the state, regardless of size, have a
difference score at or near 0 percent. This includes two agencies in the state with 500+
officers. In other words, there are five police agencies in Arizona with 500+ sworn
officers, and only three of those emerge as low-misconduct generating agencies.
Nevertheless, the correlation between agency size and “protective” organizational
features should be explored in future research.
Third, we adopted a case study approach to examine organizational correlates of
low- and high-misconduct generating agencies based on difference scores and LEMAS
data. This study identified a number of organizational characteristics among lowgenerating misconduct agencies including more stringent officer hiring standards,
increased officer training, commitment to data-driven policing strategies, community and
problem-oriented policing, and robust internal accountability processes, including
internal affairs units and early warning systems. Results mirror findings from the few
prior organizationally driven misconduct studies (Eitle et al., 2014)[8], and underscore
the importance of the organization in theories of police misconduct (e.g. Kappeler et
al.’s (1998) anthropological framework). For example, the results are consistent with
prior research highlighting officer education and training as important protective factors
against misconduct (Kane and White, 2009; Kappeler et al., 1992; Shjarback and White,
2016). Organizations with mechanisms in place to provide transparency to their officers
(Wolfe and Piquero, 2011) and the citizens they serve also had lower rates of
misconduct, supporting the adoption of organizational efforts to foster these
relationships. Similarly, results suggest that strong internal accountability mechanisms
designed to identify and intervene in officer misconduct might be protective at the
agency level (Walker and Archbold, 2014).
The findings of this study should be interpreted in the context of several
limitations. AZPOST is a reactive investigative body and only addresses incidents of
misconduct that are voluntarily brought to the board’s attention. Consequently, AZPOST
data might not be representative of the larger universe of officer misconduct in Arizona.
The authors originally hypothesized that only the most serious cases would be heard by
AZPOST (e.g. warranting state-level review and possible de-certification), but results
suggest that less serious forms are more frequent. Moreover, though most of the larger
agencies in the state have stringent policies that require incidents be reported to
AZPOST, it is unclear whether these standards hold in smaller agencies. Despite these
mandatory reporting policies in larger agencies, we still found larger agencies were
generally under-represented in the AZPOST data. In sum, the prevalence and nature of
misconduct not reported to AZPOST remains unknown.

It is also important to provide a cautionary note about the terminology in this
study. We do not intend to suggest that all agencies that are under-represented in the
AZPOST data are “good” and those that are over-represented are “bad.” It is possible
that over-represented agencies are more vigilant in addressing misconduct and
reporting it to AZPOST and those that are under-represented address misconduct using
less formal measures. However, we did speak with representatives of many of the
under-represented agencies and found that these agencies have strict automatic
reporting policies. Additionally, the analyses presented here are descriptive. Future
studies could employ more sophisticated analysis. Finally, these results only represent
agencies within Arizona. As most states have a POST board, future research should
examine agency risk and protective factors for police misconduct in other settings.
This study suggests that academics and practitioners should continue to
emphasize organizational variables for study, prevention and response to police officer
misconduct. Many of the features we identified as important protective factors against
agency misconduct, such as hiring, training and accountability mechanisms, are
currently targeted in consent decrees across the nation and are supported by federal
law enforcement programs (e.g. the COPS office). Police scholars have long suggested
that an organizational focus is required to fully understand the causes and correlates of
poor officer behaviors. The relative absence of multi-agency studies of police
misconduct has resulted in a dearth of empirical evidence supporting those assertions.
This study offers evidence regarding the importance of organizational attributes, and
perhaps more importantly, it offers a framework for researchers to replicate in
subsequent state-level studies of police misconduct.

Notes
1. Slager’s state trial ended in a mistrial (deadlocked jury) but in May 2017 he pled guilty
to violating Walter Scott’s civil rights in a subsequent federal case. Shelby, HeagganBrown, and Yanez were all found not guilty at trial. Tensing was prosecuted twice and
both cases ended in mistrials (deadlocked juries, most recently in May 2017).
2. See Crank and Langworthy (1992), Katz (2001), Maguire and Katz (2002), Wolfe and
Nix (2016) for research examining organizational theory and policing. See Hickman and
Piquero (2009), Jennings and Rubado (2017) for research examining organizational
features of police agencies using LEMAS.
3. The third author served as a member of the AZPOST board for several years. His
service led to our access to AZPOST cases within the study period.
4. The agency that did not report a single case to AZPOST only had four sworn officers
in 2000 and five in 2011, per the FBI UCR. Given that several other small agencies did
report misconduct to AZPOST, we are not overly concerned the data underrepresent
misconduct occurring in small police agencies.

5. LEMAS includes organizational information for all agencies with 100 or more sworn
officers, and from a stratified random sample of smaller agencies. We use 2007 LEMAS
data given the study period (2000-2011). This included 31 total departments in Arizona.
We also compared the 2003 LEMAS data to the 2007 data. There were no notable
organizational differences between the two waves.
6. AZPOST can also deny certification to applicants or recruits that engage in
misconduct prior to completing the certification process. Though it is uncommon,
AZPOST will dismiss misconduct cases that are subject to exigent circumstances. This
generally occurs when an officer is also subject to criminal investigation or prosecution.
7. Pseudonyms are used for all agencies in the study.
8. Eitle et al. (2014) found that a full time internal affairs unit increases counts of
misconduct, which they attribute to improved ability to identify and investigate these
incidents within an agency. However, our findings may differ because internal affairs
units increase early internal identification of problem officers and reduce the need for
agencies to forward these misconduct cases to AZPOST.
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